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Abstract
This paper studies the cooperative games with restricted cooperation among players.
We de¯ne the situations in which both a coalition structure and a network exist simultane-
ously and each of them mutually depends on each other. We call such situations two-level
networks. By using a two-step approach, we de¯ne and axiomatize an allocation rule of
the cooperative games with two-level networks. The allocation rule is an extension of the
Myerson value and also, is characterized by the Owen value.
JEL classi¯cation: C71
Keywords: cooperative game, coalition structure, network,
1 Introduction
In many social and economic situations, agents form a group and act as if they were a single
agent. For example, neighbor countries form a regional economic bloc such as EU and APEC
and get into line with each other against other countries, labors form a labor union and negotiate
jointly with a manager, ¯rms form a cartel and jointly set a uniform high price and politicians
form a political party and coordinate their policy. The reason why agents act in such a way
is, in such situations, forming a group and coordinating the actions of each of the agents in
the group lead to better outcomes for each of them if they appropriately distribute the surplus
generated by their cooperation. Such group formation and surplus distributions are analyzed
mainly by the cooperative games.
Since cooperation needs coordination and coordination requires communication, in real
situations, agents who are not able to communicate with each other cannot cooperate even if
they preferred to do so. The cause of lack of communication is, for example, lack of friendship,
restriction by geographical location, technological problems and legislation. By introducing
a network, Myerson (1977) generalized cooperative games and considered such cooperation
restricted situations. In the Myerson's model, only those players who are connected in a
network by themselves can cooperate. Aumann and Dreze (1974) also considered the restriction
of cooperation in a di®erent way. They used coalition structures and only those players who are
in the same element of a coalition structure can cooperate. The Aumann and Dreze's model
can be interpreted as special cases of the Myerson's model, but later, Kamijo (2006) extended
the possibility of cooperation in the Aumann and Dreze's model. In his interpretation, players
in di®erent elements of a coalition structure can also cooperate if all players in the elements
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gather. Such cooperation restriction structures are no longer represented by the Myerson's
model.
The Myerson's model focuses on individual aspects of the communication in a group while,
the Aumann and Dreze model (with Kamijo interpretation) focuses on collective aspects of
groups. Since these two aspects are closely related, we have to consider both of the two
simultaneously. Vazquez-Brage et al. (1996) considered the situation in which both networks
and coalition structures exist simultaneously. In their model, however, both networks and
coalition structures are treated independently and hence the second aspects of communications
and group formations which we mentioned in the above is not represented in the model itself.
They include this aspect by use of a coalitional solution concept. While, in this paper, we
consider the situation in which both networks and coalition structures exist simultaneously
and mutually depend on each other. Communication in such situations can be represented by
two-level: the ¯rst level is only between players in the same element of a coalition structure
and the second level is between elements of the coalition structure. We call such structures
two-level networks and study cooperative games with two-level networks.
Two-level networks are observed in many social and economic situations. As an example,
consider the case of a cartel. In a cartel, there are many ¯rms and, inside of each ¯rm, there
are some workers. Each worker of a ¯rm can only communicate with other workers in the
same ¯rm because, in general, each ¯rm has its industrial secrets and hence only a worker of a
¯rm does not have the authority to communicate with the outside of the ¯rm. Such worker's
restricted communication situations are described in the ¯rst level. Also, if a ¯rm do business
with another ¯rm, in general, all workers in the ¯rm jointly communicate with the all workers
who are in the other ¯rm. Such collective communication situations between ¯rms are described
in the second level.
The paper is organized as follows. Basic de¯nitions and notations are given in Section 2.
The de¯nition of the two-level networks is given in Section 3. Cooperative games with the
two-level networks and an allocation rule of the games are discussed in Section 4. Another
representation of the allocation rule is given in Section 5. Further discussions are given in
Section 6.
2 Basic de¯nitions and notations
2.1 Cooperative games
A pair (N; v) is a cooperative game with transferable utility or, simply, a game where N =
f1; 2; : : : ; ng is a set of ¯nite players and v : 2N ! R with v(;) = 0 is a characteristic function.
Let jN j = n where j ¢ j represents the cardinality of a set. A subset S of N is called a coalition.
For any S µ N , v(S) represents a value of the coalition. For any S µ N , a pair (S; vjS) is a
subgame of (N; v) on S where vjS(T ) = v(T ) for any T µ S.
Let ¼ be a permutation on N and ¦(N) be a set of all permutations on N . Given ¼ and a
player i 2 N , a player j 2 N satis¯es ¼(j) < ¼(i) is called a predecessor for i in ¼ and a set
of all predecessors for i in ¼ is denoted by PR¼i . Let v(PR
¼
i [ fig) ¡ v(PR¼i ) be i's marginal
contributions in ¼. The Shapley value Á (Shapley (1953)) is de¯ned as follows: For each i 2 N ,
Ái(N; v) =
1
j¦(N)j
X
¼2¦(N)
(v(PR¼i [ fig)¡ v(PR¼i )):1
2
2.2 Games with coalition structures
Let B be a partition of N , that is, any two elements of B are mutually disjoint and the union
of all the elements of B is N . We call B a coalition structure and each element of B a block. A
triple (N; v;B) is a game with a coalition structure.
Three generalizations are considered as the Shapley value on games with coalition struc-
tures. One is the Aumann and Dreze value introduced by Aumann and Dreze (1974). In
Aumann and Dreze value, players interact with only players in the same block and gets his
Shapley value of the restricted game. The Aumann and Dreze value ÃAD is de¯ned as follows:
For each i 2 N with i 2 B 2 B,
ÃADi (N; v;B) = Ái(B; vjB):
Another is the two-step Shapley value introduced by Kamijo (2006). In the two-step Shapley
value, the game (N; v;B) is treated as a two-step. For the ¯rst step, each player participate
in the game within the block to which he belongs and he gets the Shapley value of the game.
For the second step, players in the same block unite and participate in a game between blocks
as if they were a single player. The game between blocks in de¯ned as a pair (B; w) where
w : 2B ! R satis¯es w(S) = v(SB2S B)¡PB2S v(B) for any S µ B. Each block gets its the
Shapley value of the game and it is equally distributed to all players in the block. We call this
method a two-step approach and the two-step Shapley value ÃK is de¯ned as follows: For each
i 2 N with i 2 B 2 B,
ÃKi (N; v;B) = Ái(B; vjB) +
ÁB(B; w)
jBj :
Unlike the Aumann and Dreze value and the two-step Shapley value, Owen (1977) restricted
the set of permutations on N and introduced the Owen value. A permutation ¼ 2 ¦(N) is
consistent with B if for any i; j; k 2 N with ¼(i) < ¼(k) < ¼(j) and i; j 2 B 2 B then k 2 B.
In other words, ¼ is consistent with B if players in the same block appear successively in ¼.
Let §(N;B) be a set of all permutations on N , which is consistent with B. The Owen value
ÃO is de¯ed as follows: For any i 2 N ,
ÃOi (N; v;B) =
1
j§(N;B)j
X
¼2§(N;B)
(v(PR¼i [ fig)¡ v(PR¼i )):
2.3 Games with networks
Given N , we call a two players coalition fi; jg µ N a link. A link fi; jg represents a communi-
cation channel between i and j and, for simplicity, is denoted by ij. Let ¹L = fijji; j 2 N; i 6= jg
be a complete links on N . A pair (N;L) is a network where L µ ¹L. For any S µ N , a pair
(S;L(S)) is a subnetwork on S where L(S) = fij 2 Lji; j 2 Sg.2 Given (S;L(S)), if there
exists a ¯nite sequence of players i1; : : : ; iH such that (i) i1 = i, (ii) iH = j and (iii) for any
1The Shapley value Á can be represented by the following way: For each i 2 N ,
Ái(N; v) =
X
SµNnfig
jSj!(n¡ 1¡ jSj)!
n!
(v(S [ fig)¡ v(S)):
2By de¯nition, L(N) = L. We abbreviate L(N) to L.
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h = 1; : : : ;H ¡ 1; ihih+1 2 L(S) then i is connected to j in the subnetwork. Clearly, if i is con-
nected to j in (S;L(S)), then j is connected to i in (S;L(S)) and vice versa. In a subnetwork,
two players are connected with each other if and only if they can communicate with each other.
Notice that, even if two players do not have a link between them, they can communicate with
each other if they are connected. In that case, communication among them relies on other
players. For any i 2 S, let
Ci(L(S)) = fig [ fjjj is connected to i in L(S)g
be a set of players with whom i can communicate with i in (S;L(S)) and let
S=L = fCi(L(S))ji 2 Sg
be a communicable partition of S, that is, only i; j 2 C 2 S=L can communicate with each
other in (S;L(S)).
A triple (N; v; L) is a game with a network. A generalization of the Shapley value of
games with networks is the Myerson value introduced by Myerson (1977). The Myerson value
evaluates each player's contributions not only in a characteristic function but also in a network.
Given (N; v; L), we restrict the function v by L as the following way: For any S µ N ,
vL(S) =
X
C2S=L
v(C)
The Myerson value ¹ is de¯ned as follows: For any i 2 N ,
¹i(N; v; L) = Ái(N; vL):
3 Two-level networks
In this section, we de¯ne communication situations in which networks and coalition structures
exist simultaneously and mutually depend on each other. Such communication situations are
called two-level networks. In a two-level network, there are two types of communication. Each
of the two is represented by links between players and links between blocks respectively.
Let L^1 = fijji; j 2 B; i 6= j; B 2 Bg. L^1 contains all links between players in the same
block but does not contain links between players in di®erent blocks. A pair (N;L1) is a ¯rst
level network where L1 µ L^1. By de¯nition, a ¯rst level network describes a communication
situation among players but the communication is restricted to the players within each block.
Next, let ¹L2 = fBB0jB;B0 2 B; B 6= B0g, where BB0 represents a link fB;B0g. ¹L2 contains
all links between blocks. A pair (B; L2) is a second level network where L2 µ ¹L2. A second
level network describes a communication situation between blocks. Then a triple (N;B;L) is a
two-level network where L = (L1; L2). An example of the two-level network is given in Fig.1.
By the de¯nitions of ¯rst and second level networks, each of ¯rst and second level networks
corresponds to the networks mentioned in Subsection 2.3. Since subnetworks, connectedness
and communicable partitions are de¯ned parallel to each de¯nition, we don't mention them in
detail here but, let me point out one thing. For second level networks, subset of a coalition
structure is a collection of a set of players. To represent a collection, we use the script such as
S µ B, L2(S) or CB(L2).
The important problem is, in a two-level network as a whole, who can cooperate with each
other? Considering the two aspects of communication and group formation we mentioned in
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player 1 player 2
player 5player 3
block B0
block B
player 4
player 6 player 7
block B00
Figure 1: An example of the two-level networks
Section 1, we de¯ne the set of players with whom each player can cooperate in a two-level
network as a whole as following way. For each i 2 N with i 2 B 2 B, Let
Di(L) =
(
Ci(L1) If there exists no B0 2 B such that BB0 2 L2S
B002CB(L2)B
00 otherwise
:
We can interpret Di(L) as a set of players with whom i can cooperate in (N;B;L). If a block
which contains him does not form any link in the second level network, he can only cooperate
with players who are connected with him. Otherwise, from the collective aspect of groups,
he can cooperate with any players in blocks which connected with the block containing him
in the second level network. In addition, through communication between players who are in
di®erent blocks, he can cooperate with all players who are in the same block even if who are
not connected with him in the ¯rst level network. Let
N=L = fDi(L)ji 2 Ng
be a communicable partition of N in (N;B;L). N=L is a collection of the maximal set of
players who can communicate in (N;B;L). Hence it is composed of unions of blocks connected
with each other and sets of players connected with each other in each block which forms no
link in the second level network. In the case of Fig.1, the coalition f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g can cooperate
but f6; 7g cannot cooperate because they are not connected and B00 does not have link between
other blocks. Therefore, N=L = ff1; 2; 3; 4; 5g; f6g; f7gg.
4 Games with two-level networks and allocation rule
A 4-tuple (N; v;B;L) is a game with a two-level network. Given N , let ¡N be a set of all games
with two-level networks. An allocation rule of games with two-level networks is a function
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which assigns a n-dimensional vector to all games in ¡N . We mention three axioms, which
allocation rules should satisfy.
The ¯rst axiom is related to e±ciency. In the games, each coalition generates a value by
cooperation among players in the coalition. Hence the value generated by a maximal set of
players who can cooperate with each other must be fully divided among them.
Two-level component e±ciency; An allocation rule Â satis¯es two-level component e±-
ciency if for any (N; v;B;L) 2 ¡N and any D 2 N=L,X
i2D
Âi(N; v;B;L) = v(D):
The second axiom is related to fairness of allocation. Assume that a link between players
is formed if both players agree. Then, two players should gain equally from their bilateral
agreement. In other words, the in°uence of breaking a link between players should be equal to
both of the players.
Within block fairness; An allocation rule Â satis¯es within block fairness if for any (N; v;B;L) 2
¡N where L = (L1; L2) and any ij 2 L1,
Âi(N; v;B;L)¡ Âi(N; v;B;L ¡ ij) = Âj(N; v;B;L)¡ Âj(N; v;B;L ¡ ij);
where L ¡ ij = (L1 ¡ ij; L2) and L1 ¡ ij = L1nfijg.
The third axiom is also related to fairness of allocation. Assume that a link between blocks
is formed if both blocks agree and a block agrees only if all players in the block agree.3 Then,
two blocks should gain equally from their bilateral agreement. Moreover, from collective aspect
of the group, all players in the same block should gain equally. In other words, among each
blocks, the sum of the in°uence of breaking a link between blocks should be equal to both of
the blocks and the in°uence of breaking a link between blocks should be equal to all players in
the same block.
Between block fairness; An allocation rule Â satis¯es between block fairness if for any
(N; v;B;L) 2 ¡N where L = (L1; L2), any BB0 2 L2, any i 2 B and any j 2 B0,
jBj
³
Âi(N; v;B;L)¡Âi(N; v;B;L¡BB0)
´
= jB0j
³
Âj(N; v;B;L)¡Âj(N; v;B;L¡BB0)
´
;
where L ¡BB0 = (L1; L2 ¡BB0) and L2 ¡BB0 = L2nfBB0g.
In the above axiom, the collective aspects of the group plays a critical role. If we ignore the
aspect and modi¯ed the axiom as \the in°uence of breaking a link between blocks is same for
any players in both of the blocks" then, the modi¯ed axiom and within block fairness together
are equivalent to fairness on the game with conference structures introduced by Myerson (1980).
By the three axioms, we can de¯ne a unique allocation rule. To de¯ne the allocation rule, we
need some more de¯nitions. In the allocation rule, we use the two-step approach. For the ¯rst
3For this assumption, readers may have the following question: In the case of Fig.1, block B0 forms a link
although players in the block are not connected with each other within the block. How do they reach the
agreement with forming link to other blocks? The answer of this question is the following. Communication
between blocks are executed by agents employed by each block and the agents are connected with all players in
the block which employs him.
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step, each player participates in the game within the block to which he belongs and he receives
the Myerson value of the game. For the second step, each block which want to collaborate
with other block employs a agent and the agents participate in the game between blocks as
a representative of each block. This agent is not a member of the player set N . Each agent
participates in the game, receives the Myerson value of the game and distributes it equally
among all players in the block. Mathematically, for players in B 2 B, the game considered in
the ¯rst step is de¯ned as a triple (B; vjB; L1(B)) and the game considered in the second step
is de¯ned as a triple (B; wL1 ; L2) where wL1 : 2B ! R with wL1(;) = 0 is de¯ned as follows:
For any S µ B,
wL1(S) =
8<:0 if jSj = 1v( [
B02S
B0)¡
X
B02S
vL
1
(B0) otherwise :
4
In addition, in our allocation rule, the function wL1 is restricted by L2 as the following way:
For any S µ B,
(wL1)
L2(S) =
X
C2S=L2
wL1(C)
Then, the next theorem holds.
Theorem 1. For any (N; v;B;L) 2 ¡N , there exists a unique allocation rule ÂM which satis¯es
two-level component e±ciency, within block fairness and between block fairness. The allocation
rule is de¯ned as follows: For each i 2 N with i 2 B 2 B,
ÂMi (N; v;B;L) = ¹i(B; v; L1) +
¹B(B; wL1 ; L2)
jBj :
The following example illustrates the allocation rule de¯ned in the above theorem.
Example 1. Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g; v(S) = (jSj ¡ 1)2 for any S µ N;B = fB;B0g =
ff1; 2; 3g; f4; 5gg and L = (L1; L2) = ff12; 23; 45g; fBB0gg.
Then, ¹(B; v; L1) = (1412 ;
20
12 ;
14
12), ¹(B
0; v; L1) = ( 612 ;
6
12). and ¹(B; v; L2) = (6612 ; 6612). Thus,
ÂM (N; v;B;L) = (3612 ; 4212 ; 3612 ; 3912 ; 3912).
Before we give proof, it is worth mentioning the relationships between the allocation rule
de¯ned in the above theorem and values we mentioned in Section 2. If there exists no links
between blocks, (one typical example is the case that the coalition structure is the coarsest
one), ÂM coincides with the Myerson value of (N; v; L1). Moreover, in this case, Theorem
1 is equivalent to the axiomatization of the Myerson value (Myerson (1977)) since two-level
component e±ciency is equivalent to component e±ciency, within block fairness is equivalent
to fairness and between block fairness is trivial. In the case that the coalition structure is the
¯nest one, the similar result is obtained. If there exist all links between all players in the same
block and no/all links between all blocks, ÂM coincides with the Aumann and Dreze value/the
two-step Shapley value respectively.
Proof of Theorem 1. First of all, we identify ÂM satis¯es each of three axioms. First, we check
two-level component e±ciency. There are two types of D 2 N=L, such that (i) D µ B for some
B 2 B or (ii) otherwise.
4Readers may not be confused by writing (B; v; L1) instead of (B; vjB ; L1(B)) and (B; vL1) instead of
(B; (vjB)L1(B)). We use these simpler representation hereafter.
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In case (i), D = C 2 B=L1 and component e±ciency of ¹ imply ÂM satis¯es the axiom.
In case (ii), D =
S
B02CB(L2)B
0. By component e±ciency of ¹ and the de¯nition of wL1 ,
X
i2D
ÂMi (N; v;B;L) =
X
B02CB(L2)
X
i2B0
³
¹i(B0; v; L1) +
¹B0(B; wL1 ; L2)
jB0j
´
=
X
B02CB(L2)
vL
1
(B0) + wL1(CB(L2)) = v(
[
B02CB(L2)
B0) = v(D):
Next, we check within block fairness. For any ij 2 L1 with i; j 2 B 2 B,
ÂMi (N; v;B;L)¡ ÂMj (N; v;B;L) = ¹i(B; v; L1) +
¹B(B; wL1 ; L2)
jBj ¡ ¹j(B; v; L
1)¡ ¹B(B; wL1 ; L
2)
jBj
= Ái(B; vL
1
)¡ Áj(B; vL1)
=
X
SµBnfig
jSj!(jBj ¡ 1¡ jSj)!
jBj!
³
vL
1
(S [ fig)¡ vL1(S)
´
¡
X
SµBnfjg
jSj!(jBj ¡ 1¡ jSj)!
jBj!
³
vL
1
(S [ fjg)¡ vL1(S)
´
=
X
SµBnfi;jg
jSj!(jBj ¡ 2¡ jSj)!
(jBj ¡ 1)!
³
vL
1
(S [ fig)¡ vL1(S [ fjg)
´
:
The last equation is obtained by adding the coe±cients of vL
1
(T ) for any T µ B. (See proof
of Theorem 2.4 in Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001)). Similarly,
ÂMi (N; v;B;L ¡ ij)¡ ÂMj (N; v;B;L ¡ ij)
=
X
SµBnfi;jg
jSj!(jBj ¡ 2¡ jSj)!
(jBj ¡ 1)!
³
vL
1¡ij(S [ fig)¡ vL1¡ij(S [ fjg)
´
:
For any S 63 i or any S 63 j; vL1(S) = vL1¡ij(S). Hence, we have
ÂMi (N; v;B;L)¡ ÂMj (N; v;B;L) = ÂMi (N; v;B;L ¡ ij)¡ ÂMj (N; v;B;L ¡ ij)
which implies the equation in the axiom.
Next, we check between block fairness. First we show for any BB0 2 L2, the following
equation holds.X
i2B
³
ÂMi (N; v;B;L)¡ÂMi (N; v;B;L¡BB0)
´
=
X
j2B0
³
ÂMj (N; v;B;L)¡ÂMj (N; v;B;L¡BB0)
´
:
(1)
Calculating in the same manner as the case within block fairness, we getX
i2B
ÂMi (N; v;B;L)¡
X
j2B0
ÂMj (N; v;B;L)¡
X
i2B
¹i(B; v; L1) +
X
j2B0
¹j(B0; v; L1)
= ¹B(B; wL1 ; L2)¡ ¹B0(B; wL1 ; L2)
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= ÁB(B; (wL1)L
2
)¡ ÁB0(B; (wL1)L
2
)
=
X
SµBnfB;B0g
jSj!(jBj ¡ 2¡ jSj)!
(jBj ¡ 1)!
³
(wL1)
L2(S [ fBg)¡ (wL1)L
2
(S [ fB0g)
´
;
and X
i2B
ÂMi (N; v;B;L ¡BB0)¡
X
j2B0
ÂMj (N; v;B;L ¡BB0)¡
X
i2B
¹i(B; v; L1) +
X
j2B0
¹j(B0; v; L1)
=
X
SµBnfB;B0g
jSj!(jBj ¡ 2¡ jSj)!
(jBj ¡ 1)!
³
(wL1)
L2¡BB0(S [ fBg)¡ (wL1)L
2¡BB0(S [ fB0g)
´
:
For any S 63 B or any S 63 B0; (wL1)L2(S) = (wL1)L2¡BB0(S). Therefore,X
i2B
ÂMi (N; v;B;L)¡
X
j2B0
ÂMj (N; v;B;L) =
X
i2B
ÂMi (N; v;B;L¡BB0)¡
X
j2B0
ÂMj (N; v;B;L¡BB0)
which implies eq.1.
Next, by direct calculation, for any BB0 2 L2 and any i; j 2 B,
ÂMi (N; v;B;L)¡ ÂMi (N; v;B;L ¡BB0)
= ¹i(B; v; L1) +
¹B(B; wL1 ; L2)
jBj ¡ ¹i(B; v; L
1)¡ ¹B(B; wL1 ; L
2 ¡BB0)
jBj
= ¹j(B; v; L1) +
¹B(B; wL1 ; L2)
jBj ¡ ¹j(B; v; L
1)¡ ¹B(B; wL1 ; L
2 ¡BB0)
jBj
= ÂMj (N; v;B;L)¡ ÂMj (N; v;B;L ¡BB0): (2)
Equations 1 and 2 together imply the equation in the axiom.
Lastly, we show the uniqueness of the allocation rule. Let an allocation rule Â satis¯es
these three axioms. Given N and B, let L1N;B = f(L1; L2)jL1 µ L^1 and L2 = ;g and L2N;B =
f(L1; L2)jL1 µ L^1 and L2 µ ¹L2g. By de¯nitions, L1N;B µ L2N;B. As we mentioned before, for
any L 2 L1N;B, ÂM coincides with the Myerson value and it is unique.
In case of L 2 L2N;B, for any L 2 L2N;B, there exist ~L = (~L1; ;) 2 L1N;B and L2 µ ¹L2 such
that L = (~L1; L2). If jL2j = 0, then L 2 L1N;B and Â = ÂM . Suppose Â = ÂM holds in case
jL2j = a¡ 1 (a is a natural number), and consider the case jL2j = a.
For the case D 2 N=L, which satis¯es there exists B 2 B such that B ¶ D, the coincidence
is shown by the same manner as previous one. For the case D 2 N=L, which satis¯es D includes
at least two blocks, for any BB0 2 L2, with B;B0 µ D, any i 2 B and any j 2 B0, between
block fairness and supposition above imply
jBjÂi(N; v;B;L)¡ jB0jÂj(N; v;B;L) = jBjÂi(N; v;B;L ¡BB0)¡ jB0jÂj(N; v;B;L ¡BB0)
= jBjÂMi (N; v;B;L ¡BB0)¡ jB0jÂMj (N; v;B;L ¡BB0)
= jBjÂMi (N; v;B;L)¡ jB0jÂMj (N; v;B;L):
This implies for any B ( D with B 3 i, jBj¡Âi(N; v;B;L) ¡ ÂMi (N; v;B;L)¢ is constant. Let
dD = jBj
¡
Âi(N; v;B;L)¡ ÂMi (N; v;B;L)
¢
with i 2 B and B ( D, then,X
i2D
¡
Âi(N; v;B;L)¡ ÂMi (N; v;B;L)
¢
= jCB(L2)jdD:
9
Two-level component e±ciency and jCB(L2)j 6= 0 implies dD = 0. The fact that for any
B µ D; jBj 6= 0 implies for each i 2 D;Âi(N; v;B;L) = ÂMi (N; v;B;L). Therefore, Â = ÂM in
case jL2j = a. By induction of a, Â = ÂM for any L 2 L2N;B.
Let's check the independence of each axiom. For any i 2 N with i 2 B 2 B,
Â1i (N; v;B;L) =
P
D2N=L v(D)
jBj ¢ jBj :
In this allocation rule, the total value generated by all players is equally divided among all
blocks and then the value each block receives is equally divided among all players in the block.
This allocation rule satis¯es within block fairness and between block fairness but does not
satisfy two-level component e±ciency.
For any i 2 N with i 2 B 2 B,
Â2i (N; v;B;L) = ¹i(B; v; L1) +
P
D2N=L v(D)¡
P
B2B
P
j2B ¹j(B; v; L
1)
jN j :
In this allocation rule, ¯rst, each player receives his Myerson value of the game within block to
which he belongs. Then, the total value generated by all players minus sum of the value each
player has already received is equally divided among all players. This allocation rule satis¯es
within block fairness and between block fairness but does not satisfy two-level component
e±ciency. This allocation rule satis¯es two-level component e±ciency and within block fairness
but if L2 6= ;, dose not satisfy between block fairness.
For any i 2 N with i 2 B 2 B,
Â3i (N; v;B;L) =
8<:v(Ci(L1)) +
¹B(B;wL1 ;L2)
jBj if i = minCi(L
1)
¹B(B;wL1 ;L2)
jBj otherwise:
This allocation rule also use the two-step approach. For the ¯rst step, in the game with in
each block, the value generated by each component is monopolized by the player who has
smallest number in the component. For the second step, as same as ÂM , each block receives
the Myerson value and it is equally divided among all players in the block. This allocation
rule satis¯es two-level component e±ciency and between block fairness but, if L1 6= ;, does not
satisfy within block fairness.
5 Another characterization of the allocation rule
By de¯nition, our allocation rule seems to strongly depend on the two-step approach. This
section gives our allocation rule another characterization which does not use the two-step
approach. Instead of using the two-step approach, we restricts the function v by a two-level
network L as a whole and apply the Owen value.
For any S µ N , let a triple (S;BjS ;L(S)) be a two-level subnetwork on S where BjS =
fB \ SjB 2 Bg and L2jS = fBB0 2 L2jB;B0 ½ Sg.5 Let
S=L = fDi(L(S))ji 2 Sg
where for each i 2 S, Di(L(S)) µ S is de¯ned just like the de¯nition of Di(L). For any two-
level network and any S µ N , the value which the coalition S can surely achieve is the sum of
5By de¯nition, BjN = B; L2jN = L2 and L(N) = L. We abbreviate each of them and write B; L2 and L.
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the each maximal set of players who can cooperate with each other in (S;BjS ;L(S)). Hence a
two-level network restricted characteristic function vL is de¯ned as follows: For each S µ N ,
vL(S) =
X
D2S=L
v(D):
Then, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 2. For any (N; v;B;L) 2 ¡N
ÂM (N; v;B;L) = ÃO(N; vL;B):
Proof. Given ¼ 2 §(N;B), for any i 2 N with i 2 B 2 B, i's marginal contributions in ¼,
vL(PR¼i [ fig)¡ vL(PR¼i )), is represented as follows.
vL
1
((PR¼i \B)[fig)¡ vL
1
(PR¼i \B)+ (wL1)L
2
(
[
B0µPR¼i [fig
B0)¡ (wL1)L
2
(
[
B0µPR¼i
B0):
(3)
The ¯rst term represents i's marginal contributions with respect to communication within the
block and the second term represents i's marginal contributions with respect to communication
between blocks. If there exists j 2 B such that ¼(j) > ¼(i), that is, in ¼, i does not appear
last among players in B then all blocks contained in PR¼i [ fig also contained in PR¼i . Hence
in that case, the second term equals zero.
For each B 2 B let ¦(B) be a set of all permutations on B and let ¦(B) be a set of all
permutations on B. Then, j§(N;B)j = j¦(B)j ¢QB02B j¦(B0)j.
For any i 2 N with i 2 B 2 B,
Âi(N; v;B;L) = ¹i(B; v; L1) + ¹B(B; wL1 ; L
2)
jBj
= Ái(B; vL
1
) +
ÁB(B; (wL1)L2)
jBj
=
1
j¦(B)j
X
µ2¦(B)
(vL
1
(PRµi [ fig)¡ vL
1
(PRµi ))
+
1
jBj
1
j¦(B)j
X
¾2¦(B)
((wL1)
L2(PR¾B [ fBg)¡ (wL1)L
2
(PR¾B))
=
j¦(B)j ¢QB02B;B0 6=B j¦(B0)j
j¦(B)j ¢QB02B j¦(B0)j
X
µ2¦(B)
(vL
1
(PRµi [ fig)¡ vL
1
(PRµi ))
+
Q
B02B j¦(B0)j
j¦(B)j ¢QB02B j¦(B0)j 1jBj
X
¾2¦(B)
((wL1)
L2(PR¾B [ fBg)¡ (wL1)L
2
(PR¾B))
(4)
where µ is a permutation on B and ¾ is a permutation on B.
Fix a block B 2 B and µ 2 ¦(B). The number of ¼ 2 §(N;B) which satis¯es ¼(j) > ¼(k)
for any j; k 2 B with µ(j) > µ(k), that is, the number of permutations in §(N;B) which
satis¯es the permutations restricted on B is ¯xed is j¦(B)jQB02B;B0 6=B j¦(B0)j. Hence,
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j¦(B)j
Y
B02B;B0 6=B
j¦(B0)j
X
µ2¦(B)
(vL
1
(PRµi [ fig)¡ vL
1
(PRµi ))
=
X
¼2§(N;B)
(vL
1
((PR¼i \ B) [ fig) ¡ vL
1
(PR¼i \ B)):
Fix a player i 2 N with i 2 B 2 B and ¾ 2 ¦(B). The number of ¼ 2 §(N;B) which satis¯es
(i) i appears last among players in B and (ii) if ¾(B0) < ¾(B00), then all players in a block B0
are predecessors for each player in a block B00 is (jBj¡ 1)! ¢QB02B;B0 6=B j¦(B0)j = QB02B j¦(B0)jjBj .
Hence,Q
B02B j¦(B0)j
jBj
X
¾2¦(B)
((wL1)
L2(PR¾B [ fBg)¡ (wL1)L
2
(PR¾B))
=
X
¼2§(N;B)
((wL1)
L2(
[
B0µPR¼i [fig
B0) ¡ (wL1)L
2
(
[
B0µPR¼i
B0)):
Therefore, for any i 2 N with i 2 B 2 B,
eq:4 =
1
j§(N;B)j
X
¼2§(N;B)
(vL
1
((PR¼i \B) [ fig)¡ vL
1
(PR¼i \B))
+
1
j§(N;B)j
X
¼2§(N;B)
((wL1)
L2(
[
B0µPR¼i [fig
B0)¡ (wL1)L
2
(
[
B0µPR¼i
B0))
= ÃOi (N; v
L;B)
where the second equation holds by eq.3.
6 Concluding remarks
Myerson (1980) axiomatized the Myerson value by component e±ciency and balanced contri-
butions. This result also extended to our model in the following way.
Theorem 3. For any (N; v;B;L) 2 ¡N , there exists a unique allocation rule ÂM which satis¯es
two-level component e±ciency, within block balanced contributions and between block balanced
contributions.
Within block balanced contributions; An allocation rule Â satis¯es within block balanced
contributions if for any (N; v;B;L) 2 ¡N where L = (L1; L2) and any i; j 2 B 2 B,
Âi(N; v;B;L)¡ Âi(N; v;B;L¡j) = Âj(N; v;B;L)¡ Âj(N; v;B;L¡i);
where L¡k = (L1¡k; L2) and L1¡k = L1nfkh 2 L1jh 2 Ng for k = i; j.
Between block balanced contributions; An allocation rule Â satis¯es between block bal-
anced contributions if for any (N; v;B;L) 2 ¡N where L = (L1; L2), any B;B0 2 B, any
i 2 B and any j 2 B0,
jBj
³
Âi(N; v;B;L)¡ Âi(N; v;B;L¡B0)
´
= jB0j
³
Âj(N; v;B;L)¡ Âj(N; v;B;L¡B)
´
;
where L¡S = (L1:L2¡S) and L2¡S = L2nfSS0 2 L2jS0 2 Bg for S = B:B0.
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The proof of this theorem is a mixture of the proof of the above mentioned axiomatization
of the Myerson value and Theorem 1 of this paper. Hence we omit it.
Similarly, many results obtained in the game with networks can be extended to our model
as well. For example, the pairwise stability property (Myerson (1977)), the weighted extension
of the Myerson value (Haeringer (1999), Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000)), the extension
of the position value introduced by Borm et al. (1992) and its weighted extension introduced
by Kongo (2007b), Kamijo and Kongo (2007) and so on.
Lastly, we refer to further extensions of our model. In the similar way as we did in the paper,
the situations in which networks and levels structures (Winter (1989)) exist simultaneously and
mutually depend on each other, can be de¯ned inductively. Such communication structures
are called the multi-level networks. In addition, networks can be generalized to conference
structures (Myerson (1980)) and we can consider multi-level conference structures. Most of
these extensions mentioned here have already studied in Kongo (2007a).
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